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DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE:
ARE MEN AND WOMEN NOT





MERICAN society has changed significantly in the last decade.
Traditional families comprised of a working father and a home-
maker mother are no longer commonplace. Increasing numbers of
men desire, or are forced, to assume a more active role in the rearing of their
children. Consequently, employers and legislatures are beginning to debate
and address men's rights to parental leave.
This comment addresses whether providing male and female employees
with different parental leave benefits violates Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII).I The first part of the comment provides an overview
of the applicable legislation and case law concerning the right of a member
of a majority group, such as a white male, to sue under the Civil Rights
Act. 2 This right is limited by court sanctioned affirmative action plans.
3
The comment then specifically addresses case law pertaining to employer-
provided maternity leave in the United States.4
In determining whether women are given better leave benefits than men
upon the birth of a child, time off to care for the child must be distinguished
from leave to allow the woman to recover from childbirth. As only women
are disabled from childbirth, leave given to women during the recovery pe-
riod, but denied to men, should not be considered preferential treatment.
The second section of the comment addresses what is considered to be the
period of disability after giving birth to a child. 5 This period is compared to
the typical amount of leave offered to men and women by employers.
6
The third section addresses policy considerations behind requiring equal
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); see also infra notes 15 and 42.
2. See infra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
5. See infra parts III.A.-B.
6. See infra part III.C.
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parental leave policies for men and women upon the birth of a child. 7 This
section considers the economic cost and benefit to businesses of requiring
men and women to be given time off when a child is born.8 Also, the benefits
to the family from increased participation by fathers in child-rearing is ex-
amined.9 Lastly, the recently passed Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) is examined to evaluate whether men need protection under Title
VII now that men and women are guaranteed leave after the birth of a child
under the FMLA.' 0
II. HISTORY OF PARENTAL LEAVE
A. STATUTORY PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in em-
.ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin." The
statute states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 12
1. Reverse Discrimination
Title VII was enacted specifically to address race discrimination against
African-Americans and other racial minorities and sex discrimination
against women. The statute, however, has been judicially interpreted to pro-
hibit all race and sex discrimination including discrimination against white
men. 3 Title VII reverse discrimination cases arise when a white male al-
leges that he has been treated differently than similarly situated women or
minorities.' 4 In these cases, the white male must show that he was treated
7. See infra part IV.
8. See infra part IV.A.
9. See infra part IV.B.
10. See infra part IV.C.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Eg., Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
501-02 (1986) (providing relief to minority individuals who were not actual victims of em-
ployer's discrimination practices is not precluded by Title VII); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination in
private employment against white persons as well as non-whites).
14. E.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280 (holding that white employees' discharge was based
on their race and, therefore, violated Title VII); Loeffler v. Carlin, 780 F.2d 1365, 1367 (8th
Cir. 1985), rev'don other grounds sub nor, Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988) (finding that
a male employee's discharge was an act of discrimination based on his sex).
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differently because of his race or sex.' 5
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co.,16 the defendant transporta-
tion company terminated two white, male employees for stealing property,
while a black, male employee, who was also charged with stealing property,
was not discharged. The discharged employees brought suit alleging that
the company violated Title VII by firing the white employees, but not the
black employee. The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis that
no claim was stated under Title VII. t7 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision. '
8
The United States Supreme Court then heard the case.' 9 Commenting
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpreta-
tions are entitled to great deference from the judiciary,20 the Supreme Court
noted that the EEOC interpreted Title VII to prohibit racial discrimination
against whites in the same manner in which racial discrimination against
non-whites is prohibited. 2' Additionally, the Court noted that the legislative
history of Title VII contemplated that Title VII would apply to both whites
and non-whites. 22 In reversing the lower courts' decisions, the Court held
that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against whites on the same
standards as would be applicable were they minorities.
23
In another successful reverse discrimination case, Loeffier v. Carlin,24 a
white, male postal employee sued the Postmaster General after the employee
was discharged for violating a postal service rule regarding the way that mail
was sorted prior to delivery. The plaintiff showed that two female mail car-
riers violated the same rule with similar frequency and were not fired. The
Loeffler court found that the plaintiff had been discharged because of his sex
and, accordingly, had been discriminated against in violation of Title VII. 25
These reverse discrimination cases place employers in a precarious situa-
tion. In the words of Justice Blackmun, allowing whites to seek redress
under Title VII puts the employer on a "high tightrope without a net be-
neath [it]." ' 2 6 Justice Blackmun, elaborating on the employer's predicament,
15. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282; Loeffler, 780 F.2d at 1369.
16. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
17. Id. at 275.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 273.
20. The EEOC is the agency responsible for enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1988). Interpretations of the agency charged with administering the
statute are given great deference by the judiciary. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841,
847 (1992); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
21. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279.
22. Id. at 280. The legislative history indicates that Title VII was intended to "cover
white men and white women and all Americans." Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964)
(remarks of Rep. Celler)).
23. Id.
24. 780 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Loeffler v. Frank, 486
U.S. 549 (1988).
25. Id. at 1370.
26. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring)




stated that "[i]f Title VII is read literally, on the one hand they [the employ-
ers] face liability for past discrimination against blacks, and on the other
they face liability to whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate
the effects of prior discrimination against blacks."' 27 To solve this dilemma,
the Court has allowed employers to implement affirmative action plans
which discriminate against one in a majority group, such as white males, in
preference for one in a minority group, such as women or African-
Americans. 28
a. Affirmative Action Plans
In United Steelworkers v. Weber 29 a white, male worker sued his employer
after he was denied a place in his company's training program. The com-
pany's plan gave preference to minority workers to enter the program to be
trained for skilled jobs. Fifty percent of all slots in the training program
were guaranteed to be filled by African-Americans. The program was to
continue until the percentage of African-Americans in skilled positions ap-
proximated the percentage of African-Americans in the local work force.
Approving the company's plan, the Court established a two part test to de-
termine the validity of affirmative action plans: (1) the purpose of the plan
must be to eliminate imbalances in the employer's workforce based on tradi-
tionally segregated job categories; and (2) the plan must not "unnecessarily
trammel the interests of the white employees."' 30 The second component of
the test, requiring white employees to be minimally impacted by the plan,
appears to be a key factor in determining whether the Court will allow em-
ployers to discriminate against white workers. 3'
Refining the test in a later case, the Court noted that
[t]he purpose of affirmative action is not to make identified victims
whole, but rather to dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimi-
nation and to prevent discrimination in the future. Such relief is pro-
vided to the class as a whole rather than to individual members; no
individual is entitled to relief, and beneficiaries need not show that they
were themselves victims of discrimination. 32
Under this view, affirmative action plans may be implemented to eliminate
racial inequities in "traditionally segregated job categories" regardless of the
27. Id.
28. E.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 617-18 (1987)
(holding that the employer did not violate Title VII by taking the female employee's sex into
account as the decision was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan designed to remedy
underrepresentation of women and minorities in traditionally segregated job categories); Local
28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (allowing preferential
relief for individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination is not precluded by Title
VII); Weber, 443 U.S. at 193 (upholding a temporary plan which did not unnecessarily tram-
mel the interests of white employees and which was designed to eliminate racial imbalance in
job categories).
29. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
30. Id. at 208.
31. George Rutherglen & Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution &
Title VII From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467, 501-02 (1988).
32. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 474.
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occurrence of past discrimination.33 This view continues to prevail and al-
lows affirmative action plans to counter the effect of societal attitudes which
have limited entry by certain races or sexes into a particular type of job.
B. PREGNANCY IS COVERED UNDER TITLE VII
Initially, the United States Supreme Court held that an employer-spon-
sored disability plan, which covered most temporary disabilities but ex-
cluded pregnancy and childbirth, did not violate the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment 34 or Title VII. 35 In General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert36 the Court acknowledged that pregnancy only applied to women,
but considered pregnancy "significantly different from the typical covered
disease or disability .... [because] it is not a 'disease' at all, and is often a
voluntarily undertaken and desired condition."' 37
In response to Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII to specifically provide
that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 38
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) states:
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefits programs,
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.3 9
The PDA classifies pregnancy as a disability such that if an employer pro-
vides disability leave to employees, the employer must also provide disability
leave to pregnant women. 40 Employers are not required to provide women
with maternity leave unless they provide employees with disability leave for
33. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 (1987); Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (1979). In Johnson, Justice
Scalia opposed the majority view which allowed racial or sexual discrimination in the work-
place absent a showing of past discrimination. 480 U.S. at 664-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Scalia considered the majority view contrary to Title VII's purpose as it "convert[s Title
VII] from a guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for employment determinations, to
a guarantee that it often will." Id. at 658. Justice Scalia's view has not prevailed in subsequent
Title VII cases.
34. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (denying benefits for work lost as a result of
pregnancy does not violate the equal protection clause). The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To date, the Court has not changed its position that
laws governing pregnancy do not raise an equal protection issue. The Court's reasoning on the
equal protection issue accepts biological differences as sufficient justification for treating men
and women differently. For further discussion of equal protection and pregnancy laws see
Wendy S. Strimling, The Constitutionality of State Laws Providing Employment Leavefor Preg-
nancy: Rethinking Geduldig After Cal Fed, 77 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1989).
35. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that the employer's disabil-
ity benefits plan did not violate Title VII because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related
disabilities, absent any indication that the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits was a pre-
text for discriminating against women).
36. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
37. Id. at 136.




other types of disabilities. 41 Providing women with leave beyond the period
of actual disability might be considered discriminatory against men as wo-
men would be getting compensation, in the form of child-rearing leave,
which would be denied to men.42 The Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed whether the gender-based policy described above violates Title
VII.
C. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR WOMEN NOT PROHIBITED UNDER
THE PDA
In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra43 the United States
Supreme Court examined a California statute 4 which required employers to
provide female employees with unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to
four months and, upon the employee's return, to reinstate the employee in
41. Id.
42. The Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM) conducted a nationwide sur-
vey of 1600 employers in 1988 and discovered a great disparity between the amount of non-
disability related leave that companies offered new mothers and new fathers. Leave Programs
Limited to New Mothers are Open to Challenge of Sex Bias, EEOC Says, 224 Daily Lab. Rep.
A-3 (Nov. 20, 1990). SHRM surveyed 1600 employers concerning the amount of paid and
unpaid leave allowed a new mother to be with her child even though the mother was healthy
and able to work. Id. Paid leave was provided by 10 percent of the companies surveyed;
unpaid leave was provided by 44%. Id. In contrast, only three percent of the responding
companies offered paid leave to fathers and 19 percent offered unpaid leave. Id.
Part-time work options also exhibited a disparity in what was offered women versus what
was offered men. SHRM found that 17% of the surveyed companies offered part-time return
to work for mothers, while only two percent of the employers offered part-time work for new
fathers. Id. Additionally, nine percent of the responding companies offered flexible time off to
mothers, while only five percent offered flexible time off to the new fathers. Id.
Other surveys also indicate a disparity in the amount of leave offered men and women. For
example, the Department of Labor conducted a survey in 1989 and found that 37% of full-
time employees in the large and medium-size firms included in the survey could take unpaid
maternity leave averaging 20 weeks, but only 18% could take paternity leave averaging 19
weeks. Spencer Rich, Maternity Leave Benefits Increase.- More Companies Surveyed also Offer
Paternity, Child Care Aid, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1990, at H9. As discussed below, six weeks is
the period of disability traditionally believed to follow childbirth. Infra note 97 and accompa-
nying text. If the average amount of time allowed off is 20 weeks, a portion of that time must
be attributed to child rearing, rather than recovery from childbirth.
43. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
44. The statute provided:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based on a bona fide occu-
pational qualification:
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions...
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time;
provided such period shall not exceed four months .... Reasonable period of
time means that period during which the female employee is disabled on ac-
count of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. ...
An employer may require any employee who plans to take a leave pursuant to
this section to give reasonable notice of the date such leave shall commence and
the estimated duration of such leave.
Id. at 276; see also CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). The California statute
was enacted prior to the PDA in order to reverse, with respect to California employees, the
Supreme Court decision in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See supra text
accompanying note 36 for a discussion of Gilbert.
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the job she previously held unless neither the job nor a substantially similar
one were available. An employee of California Federal Savings & Loan As-
sociation (Cal Fed) brought a lawsuit against Cal Fed after being denied
reinstatement to her former job upon her attempt to return from pregnancy
disability leave. As a defense against the subsequent lawsuit, Cal Fed
claimed that the statute was inconsistent with, and was therefore preempted
by, Title VII. Cal Fed argued that the California statute provided for special
treatment of pregnant employees by requiring job security which was not
required for other disabled workers. Cal Fed further argued that the special
treatment was inconsistent with Title VII as the PDA prohibits employers
from treating pregnant employees differently than other disabled employees.
Rejecting Cal Fed's argument, the Court noted that the purpose of Title
VII was "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barri-
ers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of... em-
ployees over other employees."' 45 The PDA extended Title VII to cover
pregnancy and "to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and
equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full
participation in family life."'46 The Court held that the California statute
was consistent with the purpose of Title VII, as amended by the PDA, as it
ensures that women and men can have families without fear of losing their
jobs.4 7 The Court also emphasized that the California statute did not re-
quire special treatment of pregnant employees as the employer could give
comparable benefits to all disabled employees. 48
Although the California statute did not require special treatment of preg-
nant employees, the Court in Guerra indicated that preferential treatment of
pregnant employees may be allowed under the PDA. 49 The Court quoted
the legislative history of the PDA which stated that the proposed legislation
"does not require employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular
manner." 50 The Court further stated:
if Congress had intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would
have been the height of understatement to say only that the legislation
would not require such conduct. It is hardly conceivable that Congress
would have extensively discussed only its intent not to require preferen-
tial treatment if in fact it had intended to prohibit such treatment. 5'
The Court also noted that Congress, at the time the PDA was enacted, knew
of state statutes, such as the California statute evaluated in Guerra, which
gave pregnant employees special treatment compared with other disabled
45. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 288 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971)).
46. Id. at 288-89 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 29658 (1977)).
47. Id. at 289.
48. Id. at 291.
49. Id. at 287.
50. Id. at 286-87 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978)). Passage of
the PDA did not require employers to extend benefits to pregnant women which were not
already being provided to other disabled employees. Id. at 286; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 40-42.
51. Id. at 287.
1994]
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employees.5 2 Congress did not consider those laws inconsistent with the
PDA.53 Based on these justifications, the Supreme Court held that the PDA
did not prohibit preferential treatment of pregnant employees. 54 In reaching
its decision, the Court emphasized that the benefits provided under the Cali-
fornia statute were limited to cover only the period of actual physical disabil-
ity related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.5 5 The
Court did not specifically address whether a statute which provided women
with leave beyond the period of actual disability would violate Title VII. 56
D. FEDERAL COURTS RESPONSE TO GUERRA
Since Guerra, federal district courts addressing the issue have reached
conflicting conclusions as to whether the PDA requires equal treatment of
both sexes, or whether preferential treatment of pregnant employees is al-
lowed. 57 In Schafer v. Board of Public Education 58 the plaintiff, a male,
claimed that he was improperly denied a one-year childrearing leave which
was available to female employees. The Schafer court interpreted Guerra as
allowing preferential treatment for pregnant employees, but limiting the pe-
riod of allowable preferential treatment to the period of actual physical disa-
bility during pregnancy and following childbirth. 59 In reaching this
conclusion, the Schafer court noted that the California statute addressed in
Guerra allowed benefits to cover only the period of actual physical disability
on account of pregnancy.6° The Schafer court held that a "simultaneous
showing of a continuing disability related to either the pregnancy or to the
delivery of the child" must be shown in order for preferential treatment to be
allowed. 6 1 The Schafer court determined that a leave for up to one year for
childrearing was not a medical condition related to the condition of preg-
nancy. 62 As such, the school's leave policy violated Title VII. The Schafer
court adhered to the equal opportunity reading of the PDA.63 By limiting
preferential treatment to the period of actual disability of the pregnant em-
ployee, the court prevented preferential treatment of female workers at the
52. Id.; Guerra, 479 U.S. at 287.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 287.
55. Id. at 290.
56. However, the Court stated that a statute which was based on "archaic or stereotypi-
cal notions about pregnancy and the abilities of pregnant workers" would be inconsistent with,
and therefore invalidated by, Title VII. Id.
57. Melissa B. Kessler, Note, Civil Rights - Childrearing Leave Policy and Employment
Discrimination Under Title VII - Schafer v. Board of Public Education, 903 F2d 243 (3d Cir.
1990), 64 TEMP. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1991) (concluding that conflicting decisions have been
reached in the lower courts because of differences in interpretations of the PDA. One interpre-
tation requires equal treatment of the sexes, while the other interpretation allows preferential
treatment of pregnant employees in order to promote equal opportunity in the workforce).
58. 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990).




63. Kessler, supra note 57, at 1060.
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expense of male workers. 64
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit adhered to a broader reading of the Guerra
decision and allowed preferential treatment of pregnant employees without a
showing of disability. 65  In Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp. ,66 a male em-
ployee took disability leave after suffering a heart attack. In accordance with
his employer's disability leave policy, the employee was terminated when he
was not able to return to work after being absent ninety days. The employee
filed suit against the company based on sex discrimination as the company
allowed women to take up to one year leave for maternity related reasons.
67
The case was brought under a Kentucky statute with identical language to
the PDA. The Harness court acknowledged that the company policy gave
pregnant employees preferential treatment, but held that preferential treat-
ment is allowed, although not required, under the PDA according to the
Supreme Court's decision in Guerra.68 The Harness court did not address
whether the preferential treatment must be limited to the period of actual
disability following childbirth. The employer's policy which was upheld did
not require the preferential treatment given to women to be limited to the
period of disability after childbirth. In light of that fact, the Harness court
appears to have allowed preferential treatment beyond the period of
disability.
E. THE EEOC RESPONSE TO GUERRA
In 1990, the EEOC published policy guidelines reflecting the agency's
view of gender discrimination related to requests for parental leave. 69 First,
the EEOC distinguished leave related to the period of time when a woman is
recuperating from childbirth from leave allowed to care for the new baby.
70
Pregnancy disability leave is a "form of medical leave allowed to female em-
ployees who cannot work because of pregnancy or related medical condi-
tions."'7 1 In contrast, parental leave means "leave to care for a child of any
64. Id. For further discussion of the detrimental effects on male employees when new
mothers are allowed leave in excess of the period of actual disability, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 168-80.
65. E.g., Aubrey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that preg-
nancy expenses were covered even though pregnancy commenced prior to the effective date of
insurance coverage on the basis that preferential treatment for pregnant employees is allowed);
Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024
(1990) (determining that preferential treatment of pregnant employees was allowed under
Kentucky's counterpart to the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
66. 877 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1989).
67. The company's policy states: "If your leave is for maternity related reasons, you are
entitled to a 90-day leave to be used before and after the date of delivery. This type of leave
may be extended up to one (1) year, provided a written request is made each sixty (60) days."
Id. at 1308-09. Significantly, the provision does not require the employee to demonstrate con-
tinuing disability, or inability to work in order to extend her maternity leave.
68. Harness, 877 F.2d at 1310.
69. EEOC Policy Guidelines on Parental Leave, 224 Daily Lab. Rep. F-I (Nov. 20, 1990)
[hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance].
70. Id.
71. Id. Technically, pregnancy is not a disability. Maureen E. Lally-Green, The Implica-
tions of Inadequate Maternity Leave Policies Under Title VII, 16 VT. L. REV. 223, 225 n.10
(1991). Generally, women are not ill during pregnancy. Id. Even following childbirth, most
1994]
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age, or to develop a healthy parent-child relationship, or to help a family
adjust to the presence of a newborn or adopted child."'72
The EEOC then concluded that Title VII prohibits employers from estab-
lishing policies that treat male and female employees differently when the
employee requests time off to care for a newborn child.73 The EEOC based
its conclusion on its Sex Discrimination Guidelines whereby it stated, "it
shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate be-
tween men and women with regard to fringe benefits."' 74 The EEOC found
further support for its decision in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC75 where the Supreme Court stated that "fringe benefits are part
of the compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment which
must be provided on a non-discriminatory basis."'76
As noted above, some courts have interpreted Guerra to mean that wo-
men may be granted more generous childcare leave policies because the ben-
efit is a form of preferential treatment of a pregnancy-related condition. 77
The EEOC specifically refuted that interpretation of Guerra.78 Focusing on
the Supreme Court's language which emphasized that the applicable statute
in Guerra covered only the period of actual disability, the EEOC stated "the
Supreme Court's decision is not authority for the idea that women may be
provided with more generous child care leave opportunities than men."'79
To illustrate their position, the EEOC provided the following
hypothetical:
An employer's written policy states that women may take sixteen weeks
of unpaid "maternity leave" after child birth for purposes of recovering
from pregnancy and child care, but male employees may take no more
than two weeks "paternity leave" for care of a newborn child. A wo-
man suffering from a pregnancy-related complications [sic] may obtain
an extended medical leave, if medical documentation is provided. Med-
ical documentation is not required for females returning to work within
the sixteen week period. 80
In this example, the employer's policy is facially discriminatory as the fe-
male employee is given fourteen more weeks leave than the male employee.
However, the policy might not violate Title VII. 81 Because the employer did
not distinguish between pregnancy disability leave and parental leave, 82 it is
difficult to determine if the policy is actually discriminatory against men. If
the above policy provides women with fourteen weeks of pregnancy disabil-
women would not be considered ill during the period that their bodies are recovering from the
birth. Id.
72. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 69.
73. Id.
74. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1992)).
75. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
76. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 69 (quoting Newport News, 462 U.S. at 682).
77. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.




82. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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ity leave and two weeks of parental leave, the employer passes the first hur-
dle in determining whether the policy treats male and female employees
equally. However, if women are given fourteen weeks of disability leave af-
ter giving birth and are not required to document the disability, but all other
disabled employees are required to document their disability, pregnant and
non-pregnant workers are not being treated equally and the employer will
have a difficult time justifying the inequality of treatment. 83
F. THE SUPREME COURT'S POTENTIAL EXTENSION OF GUERRA
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether prefer-
ential treatment may be given to pregnant employees without regard to a
period of disability following pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy complica-
tions. The Court's decision in Guerra came close to answering that question.
The Court, however, limited its holding by emphasizing that its decision
pertained to a state statute which limited the preferential treatment of preg-
nant employees to the period of disability following pregnancy. 84
When addressing the issue, the Court is likely to consider the EEOC's
position described above. 85 The administrative agency charged with enforc-
ing a statute is given great deference to interpret the statute.86 Before fol-
lowing the agency's interpretation, however, the Court must determine
whether it has previously determined the statute's meaning. 87 If the Court
has previously interpreted the statute, the Court will adhere to its prior in-
terpretation, under the doctrine of stare decisis, and the agency's subsequent
interpretation will be judged against the Court's earlier determination of the
statute's meaning.88
The Court addressed the issue of whether pregnant women could be given
preferential treatment under Title VII and the PDA and answered affirma-
tively. 89 The Court did not answer the question of whether the preferential
treatment may relate only to the period of actual disability caused by preg-
nancy or childbirth, or whether the allowance of preferential treatment is
broader and allows pregnant employees to be treated specially notwithstand-
ing their physical health. 90 Interpreting the PDA and its legislative history,
the Court determined that pregnancy may be treated better, but not worse,
than other disabilities.91 In reaching its decision, the Court examined the
legislative history of the PDA and considered Congress' knowledge, at the
83. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 69.
84. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
86. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S.Ct. 841, 847 (1992); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
87. Lechmere, 112 S.Ct. at 847.
88. Id. at 847-48.
89. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); see also supra notes
43-56 and accompanying text.
90. As discussed above, the federal courts of appeals have reached differing conclusions
on the meaning of the Court's decision in Guerra. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying
text.
91. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285.
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time the PDA was enacted, of certain state statutes which mandated benefits
for pregnant employees.92 The state statutes in effect at the time of the
PDA's passage shared the goal of the California statute which was to ensure
that women would not lose their jobs due to pregnancy disability. 93 The
Court emphasized that its decision was limited to statutes covering the pe-
riod of actual disability following pregnancy. 94 The Court also noted, how-
ever, that the PDA itself does not prohibit different treatment of women.95
As the Court has not addressed leave beyond the period of actual disability,
it is likely that the Court will follow the EEOC's interpretation. As noted
above, however, the Court is not bound to the EEOC's interpretation.
Therefore, the question remains open.
III. THE PERIOD OF DISABILITY FOLLOWING CHILDBIRTH
Under the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII and the PDA, women
would be allowed preferential treatment only if the leave related to preg-
nancy disability. Accordingly, the period of time a woman is disabled fol-
lowing childbirth must be ascertained. Recent studies indicate that the
traditional measurement of incapacity may not be appropriate.
A. TRADITIONAL MEASUREMENT OF THE PERIOD OF DISABILITY
FOLLOWING CHILDBIRTH
In determining the period of recovery from childbirth, the medical profes-
sion generally concentrates on the healing of the woman's reproductive or-
gans.96 Medical textbooks indicate that physical recovery of reproductive
organs after childbirth takes approximately six weeks and imply that the
woman is fully recovered from childbirth at that time.97 Although some
obstetricians recommend that the mother not return to work for several
weeks, no medical evidence exists that returning to work earlier would cause
the mother any physical harm. 98
Williams also stated that "[i]deally the care and nurturing of [the baby]
should be provided by the mother with ample help from the father. For the
mother to provide this care, her presence at home with the infant precludes
her early return to full-time work or school." 99 This statement reflects an-
other factor traditionally considered when determining whether the mother
is able to return to work: the effect of the mother's absence on the child.
92. Id. at 286-89.
93. Id. at 289.
94. Id. at 290.
95. Id. at 290 n.29.
96. JACK A. PRITCHARD, M.D., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 255 (18th ed. 1989).
97. Lorraine Tulman & Jacqueline Fawcett, Return of Functional Ability after Childbirth,
NURSING RESEARCH, March/April 1988, at 77; see also Lally-Green, supra note 71, at 227-28
(quoting the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists' policy on postnatal
recovery).
98. PRITCHARD, supra note 96.
99. Id. This consideration reflects a concern for the baby's well-being, rather than the
mother's health. Therefore, this factor should be classified as a justification for parental leave
and should entitle either a man or a woman to remain at home following the birth of a child.
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Many people assume that women are biologically suited to the job of chil-
drearing and that a bond develops between the mother and child at birth
which may be impaired if the mother leaves the child and returns to work
when the child is young.100 No scientific data exists, however, indicating
that mothers are naturally better suited to raise children than fathers.' 10
Studies also indicate that babies can establish intimate relationships with
more than one primary caregiver 10 2 and that very young infants can readily
form a new and additional attachment to a nonparent caregiver. 10 3 These
studies support the notion that women are not the only parent able to bond
with infants, such that if women are given leave after recovering from child-
birth, men should be given comparable time off.
One benefit that a mother can provide, which a father or caregiver cannot,
is breast feeding the new baby. Nutritionally, breast milk is designed for
infants and is, therefore, better for new babies than formula.' 4 Breast milk
can, however, be expressed and stored in bottles.10 5 The courts which have
addressed the issue have agreed that refusing a woman leave time to
breastfeed is not sexually discriminatory.' 0 6
B. CONSIDERATION OF NON-TRADITIONAL FACTORS IN DETERMINING
A WOMAN'S COMPLETE RECOVERY FROM CHILDBIRTH
Recently, a study focused on new mothers' recovery of full functional abil-
ity to determine the period of disability following childbirth. '0 7 Tulman and
Fawcett's study included seventy women who had delivered full-term infants
within five years of being surveyed.' 08 The study inquired about the wo-
men's resumption of household, social, community and occupational activi-
ties that had been engaged in before childbirth and assumption of infant
100. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
101. Linda Haas, Equal Parenthood and Social Policy: Lessons from a Study of Parental
Leave in Sweden, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SETTING A RESEARCH AND POL-
ICY AGENDA 375, 392 (Janet S. Hyde & Marilyn J. Essex eds., 1991).
102. Id.
103. Marsha Weinraub & Elizabeth Jaeger, Timing the Return to the Workplace: Effects
on the Mother-Infant Relationship, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SETTING A RE-
SEARCH AND POLICY AGENDA 307, 308 (Janet S. Hyde & Marilyn J. Essex eds., 1991).
104. Food for Thought: Is Breast Milk Best, or is the Bottle Just as Good? Some Research
Validates Some Old Ideas, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 1985, at 44. Breastfeeding is thought to pro-
vide the following benefits to the baby: (1) protection against various types of illnesses and
allergies; (2) provision of necessary nutrients for the first six months of life; (3) enhancement of
an infant's dental health; and (4) reduction of the risk of jaundice. Glenn Singer, La Leche
Sends Message on Breastfeeding Benefits, League Plans Events for National Week, SUN SENTI-
NEL, Aug. 1, 1992, at 4B.
105. Suzanne Dolezal, More Working Mothers Join La Leche, Cause A Split, DET. FREE
PRESS, Sept. 26, 1989, at lB.
106. See Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1987) (refusing an employee's
request for time off work to breastfeed her new baby is not discriminatory); Board of Sch.
Directors v. Rossetti, 411 A.2d 486, 488 (Pa. 1979) (holding that plaintiff was not sexually
discriminated against when her employer failed to allow her discretionary leave to nurse her
child).




care. 10 9 The length of time before regaining the usual level of physical en-
ergy was used as an overall index of functional ability." t0 The study con-
cluded the following:
Of the forty-five women who were employed during pregnancy, twenty-
nine (sixty-nine percent) had returned to work by the time of the sur-
vey, twenty-one part time and eight full time. The overall mean
number of weeks until return to work was 18.6. Those [women] who
had returned full time did so at a mean of twenty weeks after delivery,
and those who returned on a part-time basis did so at a mean of eight-
een weeks after delivery, although these differences were not statisti-
cally significant. Of the fifteen women employed full time during
pregnancy, seven returned to work full time and eight [returned] part
time. Women who returned to work after delivery did not differ in re-
sumption of household or social activities from women who did not
return to work. I " '
The study also distinguished between the recuperative periods for women
who had cesarean deliveries and those who had normal deliveries." 12
Tulman and Fawcett found that slightly more than fifty percent of the wo-
men surveyed reported that they had regained their usual level of energy six
weeks after the birth of their child."t 3 Seventy-two percent of the women
who experienced normal deliveries reported regaining their physical strength
within this period, but only thirty-four percent of the women who had
cesarean deliveries had done so." t4
The authors noted that their survey was unique in exploring the recovery
of functional ability after childbirth."l 5 Currently, very little research has
been performed in that area. If employers must distinguish between chil-
drearing leave and disability leave when formulating the company's mater-
nity leave policy, this information is critical.116 A standard period of time
for maternity leave, such as six weeks, may not sufficiently cover the time
necessary for a woman's recovery.
C. CURRENT STATUS OF MATERNITY AND PATERNITY LEAVE
POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
Most companies offer infant care leave plans to their female employees., 17
The length of leave varies depending on the company, but it generally con-
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 79.




116. See supra text accompanying notes 69-83.
117. Randy Sheinberg, Parental Leave Policies of Large Firms, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE
CRISIS: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY 211, 213 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds.,
1988). A 1986 Catalyst survey found that 76% of the largest United States' firms offered
maternity leave with a guarantee of the same or similar job upon return from leave. Eileen
Trzcinski, Employers' Parental Leave Policies. Does the Labor Market Provide Parental
Leave?, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SETTING A RESEARCH AND POLICY
AGENDA 209, 216 (Janet S. Hyde & Marilyn J. Essex eds., 1991). When firms that do not
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sists of two portions: (1) disability leave and (2) unpaid leave of absence for
childcare and bonding with the new infant.118 The 1986 Catalyst survey
indicated that women generally receive three months or less total leave
time. 19 Generally, the employee is paid only for the portion of leave which
relates to the period of disability following childbirth.' 20
When inquiring about leave for men, the Catalyst survey found that only
thirty-seven percent of large companies offered unpaid parenting leave with
a job guarantee to their male employees. 12' The paternity leaves generally
parallel what is offered to the female employees of the company.1 22 The only
difference between paternity and maternity leave is the period related to dis-
ability which is appropriately granted to women employees only.1 23
Few men, however, take advantage of their company's paternity leave pol-
icy. 24 One explanation for male employees' hesitation to take paternity
leave might be the attitude of their employers. In a follow-up to their survey
of American companies' paternity leave policies, Catalyst surveyed employ-
ers' perceptions of paternity leave.' 25 The majority of employers surveyed
indicated that they did not approve of men taking paternity leaves.' 26
Ninety percent of the companies offering paternity leaves called the leaves
personal leaves and did not publicize that they were related to paternity. 27
Additionally, Catalyst asked companies what they Would consider reason-
able paternity leave and sixty-three percent of the companies responded that
no time at all was considered reasonable.1 28 Seventeen percent, however,
provide a job guarantee are considered, Catalyst found that 95% of the responding firms of-
fered maternity leave. Id.
118. Sheinberg, supra note 117, at 214.
119. Id. Sheinberg noted that the length of a typical leave period varies depending on the
survey. Id. In addition to the Catalyst survey, Sheinberg provided statistics from a Columbia
University study which indicated that a two to three month leave was offered by 61% of its
respondents. Id. Another study indicated that almost half of the respondents had a maximum
leave of four to six months. Id.
120. Id. at 215.
121. Id. at 217. A 1990 survey of the nation's largest companies indicated that 31% of the
respondents offered some form of paternity leave. Shari Rudavsky, New Fathers Reluctant to
Take Time Out. Fearing the 'Daddy Track,'Few Opt to Accept Paternity Leave, WASH. POST,
July 7, 1992, at A3. In contrast, a 1989 survey of medium and large-size companies found that
only 18% of the responding companies offered paternity leave to their full-time employees.
Spencer Rich, Maternity Leave Benefits Increase: More Companies Surveyed Also Offer Pater-
nity, Child Care Aid, WASH. POST, April 8, 1990, at H9. The significant decrease in the
number of employers offering paternity leave could be attributed to the inclusion of medium
size companies in the survey.
122. Sheinberg, supra note 117, at 217.
123. Id.
124. Rudavsky, supra note 121, at A3. The survey indicated that only one percent of eligi-
ble employees took advantage of paternity leave. Id.
125. Ann Curran, Why Men Don't Take Paternity Leaves, HEALTH, Jan., 1989, at 47.
126. Id.
127. Id. By not specifically identifying the leaves as related to paternity, but rather group-
ing it with other leave of absences, the employer might be sending a message to its male em-
ployees that paternity leave is not truly sanctioned. Sheinberg, supra note 117, at 218.
128. Curran, supra note 125, at 49. Paternity leave still carries a stigma in American soci-
ety. A common view is that men should not reduce their commitment to their jobs and should
always remember that their primary responsibility is to earn an income and support their
families. Rudavsky, supra note 121, at A3. Older managers tend to reinforce the younger
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indicated that a maximum of two weeks paternity leave would be accepta-
ble.129 Few studies explore men's attitudes toward taking parental leave and
their reasons for not using the leave.130 Catalyst's survey indicated that men
still hesitate to take paternity leave because of fear of the unknown and sex-
role stereotyping. 131
One scholar attempted to clarify men's hesitancy to participate in child
care and take paternity leave by grouping possible barriers to participation in
four categories: (1) biology; (2) social psychology; (3) lack of social support;
and (4) economics. 132 Biological obstacles include the belief that women are
better suited to care for children than men. 13 3 This rationale has been re-
futed in studies which show that a father's response to his baby's signals for
assistance is comparable to the mother's response. 134 Social and psychologi-
cal obstacles represent the father's attitudes toward gender roles and will be
affected by the man's upbringing, his level of education and his exposure to
different methods of fathering. 135 Fathers may believe that unpaid work in
the home is less valued in society than paid employment and that the man is
responsible for supporting his family. 136 The third factor, lack of social sup-
port, will prevent a father from taking parental leave if his friends and family
will consider him strange for taking the leave. 137 If the man's employer and
co-workers discourage the leave of absence, the man will probably not take
the leave. Finally, economic factors might influence a man's decision to take
paternity leave.138 Economic barriers include inflexible jobs which are diffi-
cult to leave, and loss of income if the leave is not fully paid. 139
The acceptability of paternity leave seems to depend on the level of the
first male employee to take paternity leave. 14 For example, a production
employees' hesitation to take paternity leave by reluctantly granting the leave and viewing
employees who take paternity leave as less serious about their jobs. Id.
129. Curran, supra note 125, at 49.
130. Marilyn J. Essex & Marjorie H. Klein, The Wisconsin Parental Leave Study: The
Roles ofFathers, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SETTING A RESEARCH AND POL-
ICY AGENDA 280, 281 (Janet S. Hyde & Marilyn J. Essex eds., 1991).
131. Curran, supra note 125, at 49. Another study indicated that men's attitudes did not
significantly effect whether the leave was taken. Essex & Klein, supra note 130, at 283.
Rather, men's use of leave was influenced by the availability of leave and whether or not the
leave was paid. Id.
132. Haas, supra note 101, at 391. Although the discussion is based on a study of why
Swedish fathers do not take advantage of the government offered paternity leave, the logic is
applicable to American fathers also. For a further discussion of Sweden's parental leave pol-
icy, see infra text accompanying notes 188-94.
133. Haas, supra note 101, at 392.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 393-94. In a survey of 45 American men, 95 percent agreed that women should
have a right to job-guaranteed maternity leaves. Essex & Klein, supra note 130, at 282. In
contrast, only 60 percent agreed that men should have a right to job-guaranteed paternity
leaves and 22 percent disagreed that men should have job-guaranteed paternity leave. Id. This
survey reflects the attitude that childcare responsibility is still primarily considered to be a
woman's job.
136. Haas, supra note 101, at 394.
137. Id. at 395-96.
138. Id. at 396.
139. Id. at 396-98.
140. Curran, supra note 125, at 86.
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company which employed approximately twenty-five employees had an in-
formal paternity leave policy, but no maternity leave policy. 141 This particu-
lar company had never needed a maternity policy because no employee had
ever requested maternity leave. 142 A paternity leave policy had been imple-
mented, however, as three male employees, one of whom was the vice presi-
dent of finance, had become new fathers while employed at the company.143
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROVIDING GENDER
NEUTRAL PARENTAL LEAVE POLICIES
A. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROVIDING MEN WITH LEAVE
1. Cost of Providing Men with Maternity Leave
Little data exists as to the employer's cost of providing paternity leave to
men. Research, however, has been done on the cost of providing parental
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). tI" The cost of the
FMLA, developed in a study by the United States General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO), will be used to estimate the probable cost of providing paternity
leave for men.
Most women who receive maternity leave beyond the period of actual dis-
ability related to childbirth or pregnancy are not paid for the period of leave
which exceeds the period of disability. 145 Therefore, most men receiving pa-
ternity leave are likely to be unpaid for their period of absence.' 46 Accord-
ingly, the estimated cost and methodology of the study of the FMLA should
provide a reasonable estimate of the cost of paternity leave. 147
When leave is unpaid, the primary costs to the employer are continuation
of the employee's benefits, such as health care, and the cost of replacement
workers or the decrease in productivity if the absent worker is not re-
placed. 148 The GAO discovered that less than one-third of workers who
took extended medical or family leave were replaced by their employers dur-
ing their absence. 149 Additionally, the cost of replacing workers was typi-
cally less than the wages and benefits which would have been paid to the
141. Barbara Butler & Janis Wasserman, Parental Leave: Attitudes and Practices in Small
Businesses, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY 223, 226 (Ed-
ward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1988).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO's COST ESTIMATE OF THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1989 (H.R. 770) (GAO/HRD-89-68-Parental Leave)(1989) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The Family and Medical Leave Act was recently passed
by Congress and signed by President Clinton. See infra text accompanying notes 199-215 for a
discussion of the Act.
145. Sheinberg, supra note 117, at 215.
146. This proposition is supported by a 1989 survey conducted by the Department of La-
bor which found that paid paternity leave was rare in medium and large-size companies in the
United States. Spencer Rich, Maternity Leave Benefits Increase: More Companies Surveyed
Also Offer Paternity, Child Care Aid, WASH. POST, April 8, 1990, at H9.
147. For differences between the Family and Medical Leave Act and Title VII see infra
notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
148. GAO REPORT, supra note 144, at 1-2.
149. Id. at 3.
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absent worker.150 The firms typically dealt with employee leaves by reallo-
cating the work among the remaining employees.' 5' If firms are not replac-
ing most workers that take leave, additional costs related to leave will be
minimal. 152
The GAO also calculated the cost of continuing health care benefits for
employees on child care leave.' 53 Interestingly, the GAO based its calcula-
tions on the number of women who would have been eligible to take leave if
the FMLA had been implemented in 1986.' 54 The GAO estimated that the
cost of continuing health benefits for women on leave to care for new chil-
dren would be $90 million annually.' 55 As the GAO's estimate was based
on 840,000 eligible employees, the cost per employee per year would be
$107.156
As noted above, few men take paternity leave when it is available.' 57 An
estimated 15 to 30 percent of all fathers will take leave for a few days or
weeks when the FMLA becomes effective.' 58 The cost to the employer of
these leaves will be small because the estimated number of employees taking
leave is low and the estimated length of the leave is short.159
2. Benefits of Providing Paternity Leave
Providing leave to employees may also benefit employers by helping the
employer hire and retain workers. 160 Employers generally provide employee
benefits in order to attract, hire and retain quality employees.' 6' Research




153. GAO REPORT, supra note 144, at 4.
154. Id. The GAO calculated the cost of leave based on the number of eligible women
after a determination that leave to care for new children is taken almost exclusively by women.
Id. For a further discussion on the societal views that create this situation see supra text
accompanying notes 124-43.
155. GAO Report, supra note 144, at 4. The calculation is based on information that 2.2
million working women gave birth or adopted a child in 1986. Id. Only 840,000 of these
women would have been eligible for unpaid leave under the FMLA as it only applies to em-
ployees who had worked for a company, which employs more than 50 employees, for at least
one year prior to taking leave. Id. The GAO estimated that women would take the full 10
weeks of leave allowed by the proposed Act. Id. Additionally, the GAO considered the pro-
portion of women who had some form of paid disability leave, paid vacation or sick leave
available and reduced the cost of unpaid leave under the FMLA accordingly. Id.
156. The GAO additionally calculated that the cost to the employer would be $102 million
if the legislation covered firms employing 35 employees. Id. As this estimate was based on
931,000 eligible women, the cost per employee would be approximately $110. Id.
157. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
158. Statements on Parental Leave Legislation (HR 925) Before House Labor Subcommittee
on Labor-Management Relations, 43 Daily Lab. Rep. F-I (Mar. 6, 1987) (statements of Dr.
Joseph H. Pleck, the Henry R. Luce Professor of Families, Change & Society at Wheaton
College, in Norton, MA).
159. Id.
160. Roberta M. Spalter-Roth et al., Improving Employment Opportunities for Women
Workers- An Assessment of the Ten Year Economic and Legal Impact of the Pregnancy Dis-
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overall job satisfaction.163
Tulman and Fawcett noted in their survey that whether the woman had
maternity leave from her job was significantly related to whether she
planned to return to work after her child was born. 164 Of the twenty-four
women surveyed who had maternity leaves, twenty-one planned to return to
work after delivery. 1 6 5 In contrast, only four of the nine women who did not
have maternity leaves planned to return to work. 16 6 Women who did not
have maternity leave returned to work an average of five weeks after deliv-
ery, whereas women with maternity leave returned to work an average of
twenty-one weeks after delivery.
167
B. SOCIETAL EFFECTS OF A GENDER-NEUTRAL POLICY
1. Stereotyping Men and Women's Professional and Family
Responsibilities
Debate exists as to whether the PDA allows preferential treatment of
pregnant employees when the purpose is to further equal employment op-
portunities for women. 16 8 Opponents of allowing preferential treatment ar-
gue that "[w]hile protecting women's jobs during their unique disability
period will further this goal.., providing child-rearing/parental leave exclu-
sively to women only reinforces stereotypes and discourages equal employ-
ment opportunities, since both men and women can care for children."'
169
Proponents of granting preferential treatment contend that if women do not
have special child-rearing protection, women will be disadvantaged in the
workplace since women tend to assume the majority of family responsibili-
ties and society continues to view child-rearing as a predominately female
role. 170
An employment policy which provides parental leave just to women effec-
tively discriminates against both women and men. 171 Men are discriminated
against because they are denied the opportunity to become involved in child-
rearing while their female colleagues are given the opportunity.17 2 Women
are discriminated against because "they are in effect being told that their
163. Stuart Silverstein, Family Leave Law Costs Them Little, Employers Find, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 1992, at DI.
164. Tulman & Fawcett, supra note 97, at 79.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Lally-Green, supra note 71, at 233 n.48 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, Series P-23, No. 165, Work and Family Patterns of American Women (1990) (finding
that between 1961 and 1985, almost twice as many women who had paid leave or other bene-
fits returned to work within six months of childbirth when compared to women without
benefits)).
167. Tulman & Fawcett, supra note 97, at 79.
168. Cynthia L. Remmers, Pregnancy Discrimination and Parental Leave, I I INDUS. REL.
L.J. 377, 400 (1989).
169. Id.
170. Id.





proper place is in the home with the children. '173
For example, several European countries have generous parental leave
policies, but these countries also have high unemployment rates for women
of child bearing years and women have remained primarily in menial, low-
skilled jobs. 174 Of eighteen western European countries, 175 only six provide
leave for both the new mother and father.176 Even in the countries which
provide leave for both fathers and mothers, women still use parental leaves
more frequently than men, 177 women do not earn the same pay for the same
jobs as men, 17 women experience declines in future earnings as a result of
being out of the workforce for maternity related reasons, 179 and women gen-
erally believe they face discrimination in the workforce.180 These figures
suggest that providing parental leave is not enough, especially when it is
accompanied with an attitude that only women need parental leave. Societal
attitudes regarding the responsibilities of raising children must be changed
before women will experience full equality in the workplace.
2. Effects of Increased Participation by Men in Childcare
In the United States, childcare is still seen as primarily the woman's re-
sponsibility. This attitude is reflected in the percentage of men who take
paternity leave when it is offered to them. '8' Few studies have been done on
the effects of paternity leaves on men, their wives and children. 182
Studies have shown that "many fathers spend only 15 to 20 minutes a day
with their children."' 83 Fathers seemed to spend more time with their chil-
173. Id.
174. Remmers, supra note 168, at 410.
175. The 18 countries considered to be western Europe are Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Shan-
non L. Antle, Note, Parental Leave: An Investment in our Children, 26 J. FAM. L. 579, 594
n.112 (1987-88).
176. Id. at 595-96. The six countries which provide leave for either parent are Denmark,
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy and Sweden. Id.
177. In Sweden, 98% of the total number of days available for parental leave are taken by
women. Joseph P. Allen, European Infant Care Leaves: Foreign Perspectives on the Integration
of Work and Family Roles, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRIsIS: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY
245, 264 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1988). The men who take leave typically take
a shorter amount of time off than the women. Id. These patterns suggest that women are still
seen as the primary caretaker of young children. Id.
178. In Sweden, considered one of the world's most progressive nations in term of gender
equality, women earn only 81% of men's salaries for performing similar jobs with similar job
qualifications. Id. at 260.
179. A survey of Swedish women found that the loss in average future earnings resulting
from a full year out of the workforce was two percent. Id. at 262. No data was collected on
women who took less than one year, but the study indicated that the effect of being out of the
work force on future earnings was generally linear. Id. The survey also found that women
who temporarily worked part-time experienced the same loss in future earnings as if they had
been out of the workforce completely. Id.
180. Id. at 260.
181. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
182. Essex & Klein, supra note 130, at 281.
183. David Milofsky, The Baby v. the Corporation, WORKING WOMAN, June 1985, at 136;
see also Essex & Klein, supra note 130, at 285 (describing a survey which indicated that fathers
spend approximately 25 minutes per day caring for their children).
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dren immediately following the birth of the child, with the time decreasing
after the child's first birthday.' 8 4 A five-year study of children from role-
reversed families'8 5 indicated that children from these families were more
sociable and more persistent in adaptive-skills tests than children being
raised in traditional homes.' 8 6 Another study indicated that infants with
stay-at-home fathers averaged six to twelve months ahead of their peers in
problem-solving tasks.18 7 These studies indicate that children benefit from
active participation by both the mother and father in their care and
upbringing.
3. Sweden's Solution to the Childcare Crisis
A review of Sweden's parent-insurance program indicates that paternity
leave can become a viable option for men. Sweden's program was estab-
lished in 1974.'88 Under the program, the father and mother have fifteen
months of paid leave in order for one parent to remain home to care for a
newborn or adopted child.' 8 9 Ninety percent of the employee's salary is
paid for the first twelve months of the leave and approximately ten dollars a
day is paid if the leave is extended an additional three months. 190 During
the first year the leave was allowed, only three percent of male employees
took advantage of the leave. 19 1 By 1980, twenty-two percent of male em-
184. Essex & Klein, supra note 130, at 285-86. A month after the baby's birth, the fathers
reported spending approximately five hours with their babies each day. Id. at 285. A year
after their baby's birth, the fathers reported spending approximately three hours with their
babies.'Id. at 286.
185. Role-reversed families are defined as those families in which the father assumes the
predominate role in raising the children, either through part-time work, working out of the
home, or quitting work completely. Milofsky, supra note 183, at 136.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Joseph H. Pleck, Fathers and Infant Care Leave, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS:
TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY 177, 181 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1988). The
Swedish government developed the parental leave plan as a result of concerns about a low
birth rate in the country, a need to encourage employment of women and a desire to change
gender stereotypes. Haas, supra note 101, at 377. Since the mid-1960's, Sweden had been
involved in public debate about gender roles. Id. at 381. Debate centered on the dual role of
women in society as housewife-mother and wage-earner. Id. One side advanced the theory
that men's role in society should change, rather than burdening women with multiple roles.
Id. at 382. One person noted
[t]he concept of double roles [for women] can have an unhappy effect in the long
run. It perpetuates the idea that woman has an inherent main task, the care and
upbringing of children, homemaking, and keeping the family together .... Both
men and women have one main role, that of being human beings.
Id. (quoting Eva Moberg, Swedish journalist). For further discussion of the effect of gender
stereotyping, see supra text accompanying notes 168-80.
189. Haas, supra note 101, at 375.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 388. Haas does not consider the low response rate surprising as the program
was new and society's acceptance of the paternal role in childraising was in its infancy. Id.
Also, Swedish women were under strong pressure to breastfeed for the first six months after
the child was born and the time allowed for parental leave in Sweden was less than seven
months in 1974. Id. at 388-89. As only one parent could take leave under the Act, it is
reasonable that few men would have taken advantage of the leave in order to allow the mother
to remain home and breastfeed. Id. at 389. Additionally, Haas felt the statistics might have
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ployees took parental leave' 92 and in 1985, twenty-seven percent of eligible
men took some form of the parental leave. 193 The evolution of Sweden's
insurance program indicates that once parental leave becomes socially ac-
ceptable for male employees, it can be a desirable and used benefit.' 94
C. AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO THE CHILDCARE CRISIS - THE FAMILY
MEDICAL & LEAVE ACT
Today, only eight percent of all families would be considered traditional
families comprised of a working father and a homemaker mother. 95 Sev-
enty-three percent of women twenty to thirty-four years of age are employed
outside the home. 196 Fifty-one percent of new mothers are back in the
workforce prior to their child's first birthday. 197 In response to the changed
composition of the American workforce, numerous states have passed legis-
lation to provide workers with increased rights to take leave for family-re-
lated reasons while maintaining their job security. 19 8 On the national level, a
gender-neutral parental and family medical leave act was recently passed by
Congress and signed by President Clinton. 199
Under the FMLA, employers who employ "50 or more employees for
each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the
current or preceding calendar year" are subject to the FMLA.2° ° Generally,
employees who have been employed by the covered employer for at least
been misleading: at the inception of the program, many men were not eligible because eligibil-
ity depended on employment of the mother at the time the baby was born. Id.
192. Haas, supra note 101, at 389. The increase may be attributed to the extension of
parental leave to 12 months. Haas noted that 27 percent of fathers took leave during the first
year and a half of their children's lives. Id.
193. Id. at 390.
194. Although men in Sweden increasingly participate in the parental leave program, the
number of male participants is still much lower than the number of women participants.
Eighty-five percent of Swedish fathers took an average of eight-and-one-half days off immedi-
ately following the birth of their child. Id. In contrast, new mothers took an average of eight-
and-one-half months leave following the birth of their child. Pleck, supra note 188, at 184.
Fathers who take extended leave under Sweden's parental leave act typically take the leave for
about three months starting when the baby is five or six months old. Id. Haas suggested that
one reason Swedish fathers are hesitant to take extended parental leave is that the leave in-
volves a complete role reversal whereby the mother returns to work while the father stays
home with the baby. Haas, supra note 101, at 391. When the father takes a small number of
days immediately following the birth of the child, the mother is usually home also and the time
off can be viewed as merely helping the mother adjust to the new baby. Id. As can be seen
from Sweden's implementation of a policy designed to reduce some of the gender stereotyping
associated with childraising, improvements can be made, but they take substantial time.
195. Work and Family.- Most Women Not Offered Child Care, Maternity Leave Benefits,
Report Finds, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 771 (May 1, 1989).
196. Id. In 1950, only 35% of women in that age group were employed outside the home.
Id.
197. Id.
198. Spalter-Roth, supra note 160, at 28-29. Most of the states that enacted legislation at
this time passed parental and family leave acts designed to protect both male and female em-
ployees. Id. Spalter-Roth attributes much of this legislative activity to the Supreme Court's
decision in Guerra. Id.; see supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the Court's decision.
199. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993).
200. Id. § 101(4)(A).
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twelve months and for at least 1,250 hours of service during the previous
twelve month period benefit under the FMLA.20 1 The statute allows an em-
ployee to take up to twelve weeks unpaid leave during a one year period. 20 2
Leave is allowed for either male or female employees upon the birth, adop-
tion or receipt for foster care of a child. 20 3 The employee is guaranteed the
same or similar job upon return to work.2°4 Additionally, the employer is
required to continue health insurance coverage for the employee during the
employee's absence from work. 20 5
With the passage of the FMLA, male employees are entitled to leave, with
a job guarantee upon their return to work, following the birth of a child. A
male employee's ability to sue successfully under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act will still be important as rights under Title VII are broader than
the rights guaranteed by the FMLA. 206 First, as discussed above, the
FMLA applies only to those employers who employ at least fifty employ-
ees. 20 7 Of those employees, only employees who have worked for the em-
ployer for a proscribed number of hours are covered.208 In contrast, Title
VII applies to any employer employing "fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year."' 209 Additionally, a one-year tenure with the em-
ployer is not required before the employee has rights under Title VII; an
employee is defined as "an individual employed by an employer.1 210 There-
fore, an employee who has no recourse under the FMLA may be able to sue
under Title VII by meeting the less stringent requirements.
In addition, potential damages may be greater under Title VII than under
the FMLA as a result of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
allows punitive and compensatory damages for civil rights violations. 211
Under the FMLA, damages are limited to wages, salary, employment bene-
fits, or other compensation lost by the employee as a result of a violation of
the Act. 2 12 Equitable relief, including employment, reinstatement and pro-
motion is also provided for under the FMLA. 213 Under both Title V112 14
and the FMLA, 21 5 the prevailing party, other than the United States, may be
201. Id. § 101(2)(A).
202. Id. § 102(a)(1).
203. Id.
204. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 104(a)(l)(A).
205. Id. § 104(c)(1).
206. See supra part II.A. I for a discussion of reverse discrimination lawsuits.
207. See supra text accompanying note 200.
208. Id.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
210. Id. § 2000e(f).
211. Id. § 1981b (Supp. III 1991). Punitive damages are limited to situations in which the
complaining party is able to demonstrate that the employer engaged in a discriminatory prac-
tice with malice or with reckless indifference to the rights of the aggrieved party. Id. Addi-
tionally, compensatory damages under § 1981b do not include relief authorized under Title
VII. Id.
212. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 107(a)(l)(A).
213. Id. § 107(a)(l)(B).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
215. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 107(b)(3).
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awarded reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to other relief awarded.
V. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the Family Medical and Leave Act, men are guaran-
teed the same right to unpaid leave as women upon the birth of a baby.
Under Title VII, however, the question remains unanswered as to whether
men and women are guaranteed the same right to employment leave after
the birth of a child. Although the United States Supreme Court hinted in
Guerra that the preferential treatment allowed to women for maternity re-
lated reasons was limited to the period of disability following childbirth, the
Court neglected to expressly make that limitation. Conflicting lower court
decisions indicate that the Court's holding in Guerra can be interpreted
broadly or narrowly.
If this issue reaches the Supreme Court, the Court will likely determine
that preferential treatment allowed women must be limited to the period of
disability. Allowing women leave beyond that period will only strengthen
the stereotype that women should be the primary caretakers of children.
Reinforcing the stereotypical view of women will prevent men and women
from becoming truly equal in the workplace. Employers will be hesitant to
hire or promote potential mothers for fear that the women will leave the
workforce after having children.
A broad reading of Guerra deprives men of the opportunity to actively
participate in raising their children and reinforces the stereotype of men as
their family's primary breadwinner. In a society that views women as the
primary caretaker of children, men face discrimination when they attempt to
take an active role in the upbringing of their children. Guaranteeing that
men and women have equal rights to leave beyond the period of disability
will reduce discrimination in the workforce and allow both men and women
to actively partake in childrearing.
If the preferential treatment allowed to women is limited to the period of
disability following childbirth, the time that a woman is disabled needs to be
accurately determined. Most current studies have not focused on the recu-
perative period following childbirth to determine when a woman may return
to work. Tying the amount of leave allowed to a woman's disability period
might require individualized determinations, rather than a standard amount
of leave.
As an increasing number of women enter the workforce, society has rec-
ognized the need to reevaluate the employer's response to his employees'
families. The Family Medical and Leave Act is a direct response to the
changing face of the American family. Recognition must also be given to
men's rights under Title VII in order for both men and women to gain true
equality in the workplace and in society.
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